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BLACKSTONE'S USE OF MEDIEVAL LAW IN CRIMINAL
CASES INVOLVING BENEFIT OF COUNSEL
GEORGE E. HEIDELBAUGH*
AND

MARVIN BECKER

The current problem of benefit of counsel, in criminal cases, under the
due process clause of the United States Constitution dates back to the
twelfth century. It may well be that its origins run back into the earliest
beginnings of English Common Law. Jurists such as Christopher Saint Germain,' Sir William Stafford, 2 Sir Edward Coke,3 Sir Matthew Hale 4 and
others, in certain instances of felony, permitted the accused counsel.
Mr. Justice Roberts in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 445 (1942) explained and
justified the rule against appointing counsel in serious criminal cases by
stating that at English common law, an individual charged with felony or
treason could not employ counsel, let alone have counsel assigned to him.
Why, asks Mr. Justice Roberts, should one now be assigned counsel in cases
of felony and treason as a part of due process, when the right to have counsel
of one's own engagement was not even allowed at common law?
An examination of Britton on the question of benefit of counsel in
criminal cases demonstrates that this observation regarding the English
common law is some distance from the whole truth.5 A cursory reading of
the Stuart and Hanoverian jurists shows that counsel was allowed and even
appointed in appeals of felony and treason; and in matters of law, although
not fact, counsel was appointed to aid one charged on indictment of felony
and treason. This was the rule in Hawkin's day.6
Sir William Blackstone's description of the history of benefit of counsel
contradicts Mr. Justice Roberts's contention. He was the first jurist to challenge the rule against benefit of counsel in cases of felony or treason on historical grounds. He denied that counsel was prohibited those accused of
capital crimes in the middle ages.

Who was correct in his interpretation-Blackstone or Roberts? Using
history as the criteria, Blackstone appears to have been right. Many jurists,
before Blackstone, had recognized the injustice of the rule prohibiting coun*Formerly Associate Professor of Law at the University of Arkansas.
**Assistant Professor of Medieval History at the University of Arkansas.
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sel in cases of felony and treason. None, however, had challenged the historical basis of the rule until the time of Blackstone. 7 This paper is concerned with the historical evidence which Sir William Blackstone used to
support his thesis that the denial of benefit of counsel is not "strictly speaking a part of our ancient law." 8
Blackstone cites The Mirror of Justices as an authority on the subject.9
This work, written about 1285, is "not a serious law book, but a legal
romance."10 As Maitland says, "If at the present day a man wrote a law
book, and said in it, law forbids that murderers should be hanged; . . . he

would be guilty of no extravagance for which a parallel might not be found
in the Mirror."" We would have to exhibit greater credulity than Coke if
we accepted The Mirror as a valid source. And yet it might be profitable
if we examined the use Sir William makes of that "incomprehensible work.' 2
He refers to the following section:
When the declaration of the plaintiff has been heard, the adversary is concerned to make a good answer. And because folk do
not generally know all the 'exceptions' which can be used by way
of answer, pleaders are necessary who know how to set forth causes
and to defend them according to the rules of the law and the
usages of the realm, and they are the more necessary for the defence
in indictments and appeals of felony than in venial cases. 13
This quotation is from the third book entitled "Of Exceptions." This
limits the meaning of the words of The Mirror. They are applicable to
exceptions and not necessarily applicable to counsel for contesting issues of
fact on the general issue of guilty or not guilty. "An exception is something
alleged by way of answer in order to delay or destroy an action." 1 A full
statement of the common law rule provides counsel in questions of law, and
these may be taken to be exceptions. However, nothing is said in The Mirror allowing or denying counsel in indictments of felony or treason in questions of fact. Blackstone would have us believe otherwise. He writes:
c .. the Mirrour, having observed the necessity of counsel in
civil suits, "who know how to forward and defend the cause, by 'the
rule of law and customs of the realm'," immediately afterwards subjoins; "and more necessary are they for defence" upon indictments
and appeals of felony, than upon other venial causes.... 5
It is obvious that Blackstone recognized the validity of his authority
was dubious. He quotes from a book entitled "Of Exceptions" without
acknowledging the fact. His misuse of this source may be explained by his
desire to find historical justification for the humanization of the law. He
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believed that the denial of benefit of counsel was "not at all of a piece with
the rest of the humane treatment of prisoners by the English law." He continues in the vein of righteous indignation: "For upon what face of reason
can that assistance be denied to save the life of a man, which yet is allowed
him in prosecutions for every petty trespass?" 16 It may be that his reason
for misusing a source was a humanistic mistake. Are not all changes in the
law extra-legal?
If Blackstone is perhaps consciously unscholarly in his use of The Mirror, he demonstrates his exactitude in analysing Leges Henrici Primi (a private compilation of law made shortly before 1118). Most of the modem
authorities believe that the origin of the rule which denies benefit of counsel
to those accused of felony stems from this code of law. Pollock and Maitland, Holdsworth, Cohen, Bigelow, Pulling and others interpret Leges Henrici to mean that this was the first statement prohibiting counsel." Blacktone denies that the Latin text says anything about prohibiting counsel.
He writes:
Father Parsons the jesuit, and after him bishop Ellys... have
imagined, that the benefit of counsel to plead for them was first
denied to prisoners by a law of Hen. I. meaning (I presume) chapters 47 and 48 of the code which is usually attributed to that prince.
"De causis criminalibus vel capitalibus nemo quaerat consilium
quin implacitatis statim perneget, sine omni petitione consilii. In
aiis omnibus potest et debet uti consilio." But consilium, I conceive, signifies only an imparlance ....I
The confusion of the rule is based on the translation of consilium.
Blackstone contends that the consilium sought is not counsel in court but
a delay for a conference (imparlance)outside of court. The evidence appears
to support Blackstone's analysis. In the next paragraph of the Leges Henrici
it is stated that consilium occurs outside of the courtroom. "If, namely, an
accused walks out from a King's court to the consilium, and does not answer
the accusation immediately, he forfeits a fine of fifty solidi."' 9 It is evident
from this statement that consilium takes place outside of the courtroom.
The modem commentators have confused consilium (advise) with advocatus
and forespreca (counsel or pleader). Liebermann defines consilium as "the
circle of advisors; the friends' advice given a litigant in regard to answers to
be given in a litigation (words to be spoken) outside the room or circle of
the court; their advice." 20 Leges Henrici Primi prohibits the obtaining of
advice while outside the courtroom. It does not deny benefit of counsel to
those accused in cases of felony.
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The evidence Blackstone draws from The Mirror of Justices is invalid.
However, his analysis of Leges Henrici appears to be correct. There was no
prohibition of counsel in the Twelfth Century, in English law. The decline
of benefit of counsel occurred in subsequent centuries.21 Holdsworth suspects that the reason the accused was not permitted counsel after the thirteenth century, in criminal cases involving felonies, was the gradual elimina22
tion of appeals of felony during this period.
It appears that Blackstone was correct-denial of benefit of counsel is
not a part of the ancient law of England. Mr. Justice Roberts's observations
in Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 445 (1942) are some distance from the truth.
Medieval common law did not deny counsel in serious criminal cases as he
contended. A reading of Britton, Saint Germain, Stanford, Pulton, Coke,
Hale, Hawkins and other authorities challenges Mr. Justice Roberts's contention that at English common law one charged with felony might not employ
counsel, let alone have counsel assigned to him. Not only was the accused
permitted counsel in appeals of felony at English law but counsel was even
appointed for him. The Betts v. Brady rule as applied does not even provide
counsel in questions of law. The common law, inadequate as it was, was
better for the prisoner in this regard than the 14th Amendment due process
clause which Mr. Roberts said does not guarantee the accused benefit of
counsel.
Blackstone ends his consideration of the problem with a statement
which substantiates the conclusions of the legal historians. The humanization of English law in the Eighteenth century was a resultant, in part, of
28
the increase of the number of humane and capable judges.
And the judges themselves are so sensible of this defect, that
they never scruple to allow a prisoner counsel to instruct him what
questions to ask, or even to ask questions for him, with respect to
matters of fact; for as to matters of law, 24arising on the trial, they
are entitled to the assistance of counsel.
That Blackstone should have used medieval law to prove that accused
has certain rights, is itself in keeping with the history of England after the
Glorious Revolution. The triumph of the principles of medieval common
law over the forces of absolutism led to a liberalization of the law. It is
historically logical that a humane judge should have found the medieval law
a handy tool in reasserting the doctrine of fairness to the accused.
The first Vinerian professor of English law in the University of Oxford
handled the Leges Henrici with more skill than some of the modem historians. He may well be the pedantic antiquarian whose "legal history was
often at fault."'25 In this instance, however, he neglected historical considerations less than his more scholarly successors.
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